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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Appellant
Case No. 930566
920905486PD

vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body
politic of the STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants/Appellees

INTRODUCTION
Comes now the Appellant, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company,
(hereinafter designated as "Bear River") and through its attorney submits the following
in reply to the brief filed by the Appellees, Mike Jacobsen and Utah Valley Community
College, a body politic of the State of Utah.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The determinative statutes in resolving this case are in Utah Code
Annotated, as follows:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Annotated,
Annotated,
Annotated,
Annotated,
Annotated,
Annotated,
Annotated,
Annotated,
Annotated,
Annotated,

1953, as
1953, as
1953, as
1953, as
1953, as
1953, as
1953, as
1953, as
1953, as
1953, as

amended
amended
amended
amended
amended
amended
amended
amended
amended
amended

§31A-22-302.
§31A-22-307.
§31A-22-309.
§41-12a-103
§41-12a-301
§41-12a-407
§63-30-5.
§63-30-11.
§63-30-12.
§63-30-14.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT MUST NOT BE
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM IN LAW OR
IN FACT.
The Defendant, State of Utah's reasoning under Point I is difficult to
follow. It is submitted that it is difficult to differentiate whether Defendant is claiming
(1) that the State of Utah is not required to arbitrate pursuant to the case of U.S.
Fidelity & Guarantee v. United States, 728 F.Supp. 6 5 1 , 655 (D.Utah 1989), or (2)
that they admit that they are required to arbitrate, but that a claim for arbitration has
not been made by Appellant.
Suffice to say, in the U.S. Fidelity case, supra, the U.S. Federal District
Court merely stated that the United States Government was not subject to the
provisions of the Utah PIP Statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1 9 5 3 , as amended §31A22-309(6).

The gist of the case was that the State of Utah, by and through its

Legislature, could not impose, pursuant to the United States Federal Tort Claim A c t ,
PIP benefits on the United States.
Judge Sam stated in that decision clearly his reasoning:
" . . . The federal waiver, not state law, is the overriding consideration.
More specifically, under the previously quoted law, the extent of the waiver
may not be measured solely by the manner in which the state legislature
addresses the federal government in its no-fault insurance plan."
The Court held that the requirement of the state of Utah for arbitration
would expand the scope of the United States Federal Tort Claim A c t to require the
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Federal Government to arbitrate without congressional authorization. The Federal
waiver, not state law, is the overriding consideration.
Therefore, the application of the U.S. Fidelity case has no application in
this case for the simple reason that it's a case of federal immunity and sovereignty vs.
state immunity and sovereignty as Judge Sam stated that the Utah State sovereignty
must be subject to the United States Federal Government's sovereignty under the
Federal Tort Claim Act.
As to the question of arbitration by the state of Utah, this is statutory,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31 A-22-309(6) and we allege
that this issue or question of arbitration has become a proper issue before the Court.
A review of the facts and pleadings in the above matter will amply demonstrate that
the question of arbitration was properly brought before the Court and the position of
the Defendant that it can have the Complaint dismissed for not raising the issue of
arbitration is not apropos to the status of this case at this time.
A review of the facts amply demonstrates the Appellant's position as
follows:
1.

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint largely in the nature of a declaratory

action stating two causes of action:
a.

that the Defendant was negligent; and

b.

that the Utah Government

Immunity Act Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-11 did not apply because the obligation
of PIP benefits was contractual in nature. (R.2)
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2.

The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated February 1 , 1 9 9 3 ,

(R.19), (see the Addendum) and a Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, (R.21), (see the Addendum) which set forth the ground for dismissal based
upon Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-11 and 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 2 , failure to
state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The Memorandum, does not
mention arbitration, but merely that (1) there was failure to file a timely notice and (2)
that the obligation as to Bear River Mutual was not contractual and the obligations
between the parties were not contractual in nature, as set forth in §31 A-22-309(5).
A cursory reading will demonstrate that the Defendant did not raise the question of
arbitration in its Motion to Dismiss.
3.

Then following a hearing on April 8 , 1 9 9 3 , the Court entered a

Minute Entry, dated June 15, 1993, (R.85) (see the Addendum) which provided t w o
basis for the Motion to Dismiss:
" 1 . Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs first cause of action is
granted. Plaintiff failed to comply w i t h the strict notice requirements of the
Utah governmental immunity act.
2. Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs second cause of action fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 31 A - 2 2 - 3 0 9 ( 5 ) . "
4.

Thereafter, on July 6, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a Motion (R.86) (see

the Addendum) to vacate the Minute Entry of June 15, 1 9 9 3 , to conform to the
decision in Sue Neel v. State of Utah, 8 5 4 P.2d 581 (Utah A p p . 1993), in that the
Court of Appeals had rendered the Minute Entry moot and the said Minute Entry and
decision of the Minute Entry was therefore inconsistent w i t h the Neel case.
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5.

Defendants, on July

13, 1993, filed their Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate the Minute Entry, (R.106) (see the
Addendum) attempting to distinguish the Neel case, supra, raised for the first time,
in that Memorandum, on page 5, the question of arbitration. This was the first time
it was raised not by motion but by memorandum and was not contained in the Minute
Entry or the previous motion of Defendants to Dismiss.
6.

The Minute Entry dated September 15, 1993, on Plaintiffs Motion

to Vacate the Minute Entry of June 15, 1993, pursuant to the Neel case, supra, and
a copy of the Minute Entry, (R.130) (see Addendum) stated:
" 1) The June 16, 1993 Minute Entry encompassed the issues raised in
the foregoing motions.
2) The court reviewed Neel v. State of Utah prior to preparation of
June 16, 1993 Minute Entry and found Neel to be distinguishable from the
present case.
3) The court submits Second Request to the state of Utah to prepare
an order consistent w i t h this minute entry and the June 16, 1993 minute
entry."
7.
t w o grounds:

The Order of Dismissal (R.133)(see the Addendum) provided for
(1) failure to comply with the strict notice requirements of the Utah

Government Immunity A c t , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-11(12),
and (2) dismissing the ground pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
§31 A-22-309(5) on the grounds that the claims were not contractual in nature.
8.

Therefore, the three issues set forth in Appellant's Brief, as

follows, are still properly before the Court:
POINT I:
Bear River Mutual is not required to comply with the procedural
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30Page 5

12 as to notice on personal injury protection claims as provided for
in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-307 through
309 as to the State of Utah.
POINT II:
The State of Utah is required, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended §31 A22-309(6) to arbitrate with Bear River Mutual
Insurance Co. on PIP claims.
POINT III:
That the Trial Court committed error in refusing Plaintiff's request to
require the State to arbitrate.
9.

The question of arbitration was brought to the Court's attention

in the Request for Hearing, and the attached Memorandum (R.128)(see the
Addendum) in which Plaintiff requested the Court to vacate its previous minute entry
and refer the matter to arbitration if the Defendants were now claiming arbitration was
an issue.
10.

The question of arbitration was raised by the Appellee in its

memoranda and the Appellant raised the question of being submitted to arbitration
also by memoranda.(R.106)
11.

Arbitration has been properly brought before this Court through the

pleadings and memoranda filed. There is no basis for dismissing the matter for failure
to claim arbitration because the Appellees claimed arbitration in their memoranda and
Appellant claimed that the Court should refer it to arbitration if it overruled the Neel
case, supra.
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POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFFS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION DOES NOT
FAIL ON THE BASIS THAT THERE IS NO CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF INSURER AND DEFENDANT
EMPLOYER.
The issue requirement under Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
§60-30-12 providing for notice under the Government Immunity Act as it applies to
personal injury protection, is fully set forth in Point I of the Appellant's original brief.
The statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-5(1) provides as
follows:
"(1)
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as
to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights
or obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-301 1 , 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 2 , 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 9 . " (emphasis
added)
The Utah Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility A c t ,

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended §41-12a-301 provides that the state of Utah shall
maintain owner's or operator's security in effect continuously in respect to their
vehicles.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §41-12a-103(9) provides that
the owner's security may be furnished in a number of ways:
"(9)

'Owner's

or

operator's

security,'

'owner's

security/

or

'operator's security' means any of the following:
(a) an insurance policy or combination of policies conforming to
Section 3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 2 , which is issued by an insurer authorized to do
business in Utah;
(b) a surety bond issued by an insurer authorized to do a surety
business in Utah in which the surety is subject to the minimum coverage
limits and other requirements of policies conforming to Section
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3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 2 , which names the department as a creditor under the
bond for the use of persons entitled to the proceeds of the bond;
(c) a deposit w i t h the state treasurer of cash or securities
complying w i t h Section 41-12a-406;
(d) maintaining a certificate of self-funded coverage under Section
41-12a-407;
(e) a policy conforming to Section 31 A - 2 2 - 3 0 2 issued by the Risk
Management Fund created in Section 6 3 A - 4 - 2 0 1 . "
Utah Code Annotated, 1 9 5 3 , as amended §31 A - 2 2 - 3 0 2 provides that
"Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy the owner's
or operator's security requirement . . . " shall provide for personal injury protection
benefits.
The importance in the statutory scheme t h o u g h , is Utah Code Annotated,
1 9 5 3 , as amended §41-12a-407(2) which provides:
"(2) Persons holding a certificate of self-funded coverage under
this chapter shall pay benefits to persons injured from the self-funded
person's operation, maintenance, and use of motor vehicles as would an
insurer issuing a policy to the self-funded person containing the
coverages under Section 31 A - 2 2 - 3 0 2 . " (emphasis added)
The importance of the statutory particular provision is that the persons
that are self-insured, must pay benefits under Utah Code Annotated, 1 9 5 3 , as
amended § 3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 9 , the same as if there were t w o independent, statutory
insurers.
CONCLUSION
The questions raised in point II and Point III of Appellants brief are exactly
the same issues raised in the Neel case, supra. The State argued that there was no
contract between its insured and itself to pay PIP benefits. The Neel case, supra,
stated it was statutorily contractual.
Page 8

The final bottom line argument is that if the

State of Utah's obligation to pay PIP claims to operators of its automobile and Bear
River Mutual's obligation is contractual to pay PIP claims to its insureds, then why go
through the hoops of sending a notice before requiring both parties to arbitrate. If the
State of Utah can require Bear River Mutual to arbitrate without giving prior notice,
isn't it apropos that Bear River can require the State of Utah arbitrate with giving prior
notice? The purpose of the Utah PIP statute is to provide for a summary and speedy
remedy for the payment of claims and the settlement of claims between the various
insurers.
This is in direct opposition to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
§41-12a-407(2) which provides that self-insurers shall pay benefits and shall be
subjected to the same statutory provisions as private insurance carriers. If private
insurance carriers are not required to send notice to each other, why should the state
of Utah, which is under the same duty, demand that the hoops of notice be complied
with before they can be required to arbitrate?
If it appeals to the State of Utah's sense of justice that the "hoops" of
notice is the intent of Legislature, or should be proper procedure, by all means let
them adopt it; but it doesn't appeal to this Appellant and all similar insurance carriers
in the state of Utah who are trying to carry out the mandate of the Legislature.
Dated this J>d>

day of < * ? W t ^ y v l 9 9 4 .
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

se™>*^ A J&>*

"h6mas7V. Duff in
Attorney for Appellant
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief to
the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Elizabeth King
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid, this
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-6600
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,

vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body
politic of the State of Utah

q*&?oS"SrGP^

civil NO.

Defendants \\ > n ^ \ £ H
Comes now the Plaintiff by and through his attorney,
Thomas A. Duffin, and complains of the Defendants, Mike Jacobsen
and Utah Valley Community College, a body politic of the state of
Utah, and respectfully represents unto the court as follows:
JURISDICTION
1.

Defendant, Utah Valley Community College, is a

subdivision or agency of the State of Utah, created by the
Legislature of the State of Utah under the provisions of the Utah
State Constitution, Article XI, Section 1.
2.

This suit is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annota-

ted, 1953, Title 63, Chapter 30, Sections 1 through 38.

00002
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-23.

Jurisdiction is also conferred upon the above

entitled court pursuant to the provisions of the Utah State
Constitution, Article I, Section 7, (Due Process) No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.
4*

That on March 28, 1991, the plaintiff, pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated, §63-30-11.and 12, petitioned Salt Lake
County for relief.

Said petition was denied by refusal to answer

within 90 days as required by statute.
5.

The plaintiff hereby files an undertaking required

by Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §63-30-19.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
6.

That at all times herein the plaintiff was an

insurance company duly organized and existing under the laws of
the state of Utah and authorized to engage in the insurance
business who issued a policy of insurance to Larry J. Remm,
providing for personal injury protection coverage, policy No.
C127191.
7.

That at all times herein the Defendant, Utah

Valley Community College, was a body politic of the State of
Utah, oi an agency of the State of Utah.
8.

That at all times herein, Mike Jacobsen, was a

resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and was an agent of Utah
Valley Community College and the state of Utah and was driving a

00003
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-3vehicle during the performance of his duties within the scope of
his employment and under color of authority of Utah Valley
Community College and the state of Utah.
9.

That at all times herein, on January 4, 1991,

Larry J. Remm, was the owner of a 1978 Chevrolet automobile,
which was being driven by himself and insured with Bear River
Mutual Insurance Co. with personal injury protection benefits.
10.

The event out of which this cause of action arose

took place and occurred on February 15, 1991, at approximately
1:00 p.m. at 4500 South and 320 West, Salt Lake County, Utah,
when Defendant's Agent negligently ran his vehicle into the
vehicle owned and driven by Larry J. Remm, causing personal
injuries in the sum of $2,257.00.
11.

That at the time and place mentioned herein the

Defendant, by and through its agent, employee, Mike Jacobsen, in
the course of his employment and in the performance of his
duties, when Larry J. Remm was operating his automobile in a
northbound direction exiting 115 and turned west onto 4500 South
when Mike Jacobsen struck the right rear of the Remm automobile.
12.

The said defendant, Utah Valley Community College,

a body politic of the State of Utah, by and through its agent,
Mike Jacobsen, was grossly negligent, reckless, careless and
guilty of unlawful conduct in the operation of its vehicle in the
following particulars:

00004
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-4a.

failing to maintain a proper lookout;

b.

failing to keep his vehicle under proper control;

c.

traveling too fast for existing conditions.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Comes now the Plaintiff and for cause of action against
the Defendants alleges:
13.

Plaintiff adopts and by this reference incorpo-

rates herein paragraphs 1 through 12 inclusive of the First Cause
of Action as though the allegations contained therein were fully
and comletely set forth herein.
14.

That Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

§63-30-10.5, provides:
M

(l) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of compensation from the
governmental entity when the governmental entity has
taken or damaged private property without just
compensation."
15.

That the Utah Personal Injury Protection Coverage

and Benefits statute and reimbursement as more fully set forth in
UCA 31A-22-309(5) provides that the payment for Personal Injury
Protection benefits are contractual in nature.

That no notice is

required for contractual obligations.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays

for judgment

against

the

Defendant as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

For judgment

against

$2,257.00, interest and court costs.
Page 16

Defendants

in the sum of

-5SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
2.

For judgment

against Defendants

in the sum of

$2,257.00, interest and court costs.
Dated this £-£>

day of September, 1992.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

<<*+>,fr0k>«'j&

A. Duffin
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
9158 South Cripple Creek Circle
West Jordan, Utah 84088

Pc6
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2 S31
JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
a body politic of the
State of Utah,

Civil No. 920905486PD
Judge Glenn Iwasaki

Defendants.
Defendants Mike Jacobsen and Utah Valley Community College, by
and

through counsel, move

this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's

Complaint for failure to comply with Sections 63-30-11 and 12 of
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act and for failure to state a cause
of action upon which relief can be granted.

This Motion is

supported by the accompanying Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.
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00013

DATED this

I

day of February, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM

Attorney General

BARBARA E. OCHOA
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, this
of February, 1993, to the following:
Thomas A. Duffin
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
a body politic of the
State of Utah,

Civil No. 920905486PD
Judge Glenn Iwasaki

Defendants.
Defendants Mike Jacobsen and Utah Valley Community College, by
and through counsel, submit this Memorandum in Support of their
Motion to Dismiss.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, alleges that
it is entitled to recover for personal injury damages incurred by
its insured, Larry J. Remm, resulting from a collision between
Remm's vehicle and Defendant's vehicle on or about February 15,
1991.

0C021
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Plaintiff alleges that it served a notice of claim on Salt
Lake County on March 28, 1991.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE
A TIMELY NOTICE OF CLAIM
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act requires that an individual
must file a notice of claim prior to bringing suit against the
State, any of its agencies, or a political subdivision. See U.C.A.
§§ 63-30-12 and 13 (1953, as amended) . The claim is "barred unless
notice of claim is filed with the attorney general and the agency
concerned within one year after the claim arises, or before the
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11
. . . ."
The

(U.C.A. § 63-30-12).
notice

of

claim

requirements

set

forth

in

Utah's

Governmental Immunity Act are mandatory and "strict compliance" is
the statutory standard.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that

"where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance
with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to
maintain a suit." Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d
480, 482 (Utah 1975).
In the present case, Plaintiff's cause of action arose on
February 15, 1991, the date of Remm's accident. Plaintiff alleges
that it filed a notice of claim with Salt Lake County on March 28,
1991.

This notice of claim is of no effect since Salt Lake County
2

00022
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has no governing relationship to Utah Valley Community College
whatsoever.
Plaintiff's cause of action is barred for failure to serve a
timely notice of claim and its Complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice.
II. PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM
UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
Plaintiff's second cause of action is an apparent attempt to
avoid the notice of claim requirement by alleging that its cause of
action arises under § 31A-22-309(5) of the Utah Insurance Code.
Plaintiff then claims that this creates a contractual obligation
for which no notice of claim is required under the Governmental
Immunity Act.
Plaintiff's theory is fundamentally flawed.

First, there is

no contract between Plaintiff and Defendants, and there is no basis
to imply a contract from the language of the Insurance Code.
Second, Utah Valley Community College is not an "insurer" and is
not governed by the provisions of the Utah Insurance Code.

See

U.C.A. § 31A-12-107.
Plaintiff's attempt to avoid the notice of claim requirements
of the Governmental Immunity Act by alleging that its second cause
of action sounds in contract pursuant to U.C.A. § 31A-22-309 (5) is
without merit since Defendants are not governed by the Insurance
3
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Code.

Therefore, Plaintiff's second cause of action should be

dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action
upon which relief can be granted.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons explained above, Defendants pray
that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that it
take nothing thereby.
DATED this

I

day of February, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

BARBARA E. OCHOA
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MEMORANDUM

IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS, postage prepaid, this / ^

day of February, 1993, to the

following:
Thomas A. Duffin
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
CASE NUMBER 920905486 PD
DATE 06/15/93
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STH

PLAINTIFF
VS
JACOBSEN, MIKE
DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS WAS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT
FOR DECISION AFTER ORAL ARGUMENT. THE COURT HAVING TAKEN THE
MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT COMES NOW BEING FULLY INFORMED AND RULES
AS FOLLOWS:
1. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION IS GRANTED. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE STRICT NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
2. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF
MAY BE GRANTED UNDER 31A-22-3Q9 (5).
3. DEFENDANTS TO PREPARE ORDER.
CC: BARBARA E. OCHOA
THOMAS A. DUFFIN
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (927) of
">•'.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON^? _
Attorneys for Plaintiff
C&pecJ**
^~«-1L_>311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6600
v
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body politic
of the State of Utah,
Defendants.

MOTION TO VACATE MINUTE ENTRY
OF JUNE 16, 1993, MOTION TO
FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT,
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL ORAL
ARGUMENT TO CONFORM THE MINUTE
ENTRY OF JUNE 16, 1993 PURSUANT
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION IN NEEL V. STATE OF UTAH
Civil No. 920905486PD
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Comes now the Plaintiff and moves the above-entitled Court to vacate
the Minute Entry dated June 1 5 , 1 9 9 3 , in which the above-entitled Court found as
follows:
"
1.
Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs first cause of action
is granted. Plaintiff failed to comply with the strict notice requirements
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
2.
Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiff second cause of
action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 31A22-309(5)."
Prior to entry of the above Minute Entry and before it came to the
attention of the Court, the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Neel v. State of Utah.
Page 25
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213 Utah Adv.Rep. 43, and reversed the position of the State of Utah. The legal
argument of Plaintiff pursuant to the previous memorandum has been affirmed by the
Utah Court of Appeals, therefore, the Minute Entry of June 15, 1993, should be
appropriately amended to reflect the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Dated this, %D day of June, 1993.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

?%&&s&
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to the following
parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Barbara E. Ochoa
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
Litigation Division
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid, this^JT^day of June, 1993.
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO VACATE MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,
vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
a body politic of the
State of Utah,

Civil No. 920905486PD
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.
Defendants by and through counsel, Barbara E. Ochoa, Assistant
Attorney

General

submit

this

Memorandum

in

Opposition

to

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Minute Entry.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, alleges that
it is entitled to recover for personal injury damages incurred by
its insured, Larry J. Remm, resulting from a collision between
Remm's vehicle and Defendant's vehicle on or about February 15,
1991. Plaintiff's first cause of action alleged negligence and its
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second cause of action sounded in contract pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-22-309(5).
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was heard by this Court and a
Minute Entry was issued on June 15, 1993 ruling that Plaintiff's
first cause of action should be dismissed for failure to comply
with the strict notice requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, and that Plaintiff's second cause of action should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5).
Plaintiff has now filed a "Motion to Vacate Minute Entry of
June 16, 1993, Motion to File an Amended Complaint, Motion for
Additional Oral Argument to Conform the Minute Entry of June 16,
1993 Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals Decision in Neel v.
State of Utah'1.
ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE
ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED

OF

Plaintiff's first cause of action, based on negligence, was
properly dismissed for failure to comply with the strict notice
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Plaintiff fails to cite any new or different authority for its
proposition that the letter it sent to the State Office of Risk
Management constituted an adequate notice of claim. This argument
has been ruled on and Plaintiff should not be allowed to reargue
2
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this issue by means of a Motion to Vacate.
II.
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED
Plaintiff is not entitled to protection under Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-308 and its complaint was therefore properly dismissed.
Defendants admit, for purposes of this argument only, that
they are required to maintain owner's or operator's security
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-301 (3) , and that they are
further obligated to provide personal injury protection coverage
(PIP) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(2).
Personal injury protection is defined in Section 31A-22-306 as
follows:
Personal injury protection under Subsection
31A-22-302 (2) provides the coverages and
benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to
persons described under Section 31A-22-308,
but is subject to the limitations, exclusions,
and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22309.
(emphasis added). The next logical inquiry is whether Plaintiff or
its insured is one of the persons intended to be protected under
Section 31A-22-308.
Section 31A-22-308 identifies those persons who

lf

may receive

benefits under personal injury protection coverage": (1) the named
insured; (2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage,
adoption, or guardianship; and (3) "any other natural person whose
injuries arise out of an automobile accident occurring while the
3
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person occupies a motor vehicle described in the policy . . . ".
Plaintiff's insured, Larry Remm, meets the criteria to collect from
his own insurance carrier, but not against the PIP coverage carried
by the State.

Mr. Remm was not the named insured on the State's

policy, nor is he related by blood or marriage to the State, and he
did not occupy the state vehicle at the time of the accident.
Clearly, neither Mr. Remm nor his insurance carrier qualifies as a
person entitled to benefits under Section 31A-22-308.
As a result, Plaintiff's contract claim must fail since only
!l

[t]he person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in

contract to recover the expenses plus interest" if the insurer
fails to pay the expenses when due under PIP coverage.

Utah Code

Ann. § 31A-22-309(5).
The case of Neel v. State of Utah. 213 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah
Ct. App. 5/21/93) is distinguishable from the present case because
Neel was a passenger in the state vehicle at the time of the
accident and therefore qualified as a person entitled to PIP
benefits under § 31A-22-308. As such, she was entitled to sue the
State, as a self-insurer, in contract, to recover PIP benefits.
Unlike Neel, this Plaintiff does not qualify for PIP protection and
therefore may not maintain a contract cause of action against the
State or against these Defendants.
Plaintiff may claim that it is entitled to proceed under
4
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§ 31A-22-309(6)

which

requires

insurers

to

determine

their

respective liabilities through mandatory, binding arbitration.
This section is not applicable in the present case since neither
the Defendants nor the State are considered "insurers" under the
code. See U.C.A. § 31A-12-107. The Utah Court of Appeals ruled in
McCaffery on behalf of McCafferv v. Grow. 787 P.2d 901# 905 (Utah
App.

1990)

that

Section

31A-22-309(6)

does

not

contemplate

arbitration between a self-insured and an insurance company.

The

Court also concluded that even if self-insureds were included in
§ 31A-22-309 (6) that the courts would not be the correct forum to
pursue a claim since the statute specifies arbitration as the
proper recourse.

Id. at 905, n. 4.

Based upon all of the foregoing, Defendants request that
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Minute Entry be denied.
DATED this

day of July, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

3ARBARA E.. OCHOA
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO VACATE MINUTE ENTRY, postage prepaid, this

/5> ^

of July, 1993, to the following:
Thomas A. Duffin
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (927) of
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6600

R!CT

THIS.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,

REQUEST FOR HEARING
Plaintiff,

vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body politic
of the State of Utah,

Civil No. 920905486PD

Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Defendants.

Comes now the Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(b), Utah Court Rules,
Code of Judicial Administration, and requests a hearing on its Motion to File Second
Amended Complaint and Motion to Vacate Minute Entry of June 16, 1993, and
subsequent Request for Summary Judgment Ruling Referring the Matter to Arbitration.
Dated t h i £ £ 2 _ day of July, 1993.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

^/^PndYhas A. Duffin
Attorney for Plaintiff
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-2MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Request for Hearing to the
following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Barbara E. Ochoa
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
Litigation Division
330 South 300 East
SajrLake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid, t h i s ^ p d a y of July, 1993
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (927) of
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6600

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body politic
of the State of Utah,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO VACATE MINUTE ENTRY AND
REQUEST FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RULING REFERRING THE MATTER TO
SUBROGATION
Civil No. 920905486PD
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Comes now the Plaintiff and submits its Reply to

Defendant's

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Minute Entry and Request
for Summary Judgment Ruling Referring the Matter to Subrogation.

Background
Since the Court made its initial minute entry in the above-entitled matter,
and the Defendant has filed its reply memorandum, the Court of Appeals in the case
of Neel v. State of Utah, 213 Utah Adv.Rep. 43, handed down a decision in reference
to personal injury benefits as more fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended §31A-22-302.

Therefore, the complete setting of the case has been
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-2changed and therefore, the above-entitled matter should be referred, if the State so
desires, for arbitration, as more fully set forth in McCafferv on behalf of McCafferv v.
Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990).

ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE MOTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED ON THE BASIS OF
NEGLIGENCE,
In the Neel case, supra, it states that all PIP benefits are based on
contract. That matters based upon contract are not subject to the notice requirements
of the Government Immunity Act. The Defendant complete ignores the decision and
fails to realize that this action is not brought for and on behalf of Bear River Mutual's
insured, but Bear River Mutual's right under PIP benefits, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended §31A-22-309.
Point II.
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT SHOULD APPOINT AN ARBITRATOR FOR
A DECISION IN THE MATTER.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended § provides that self-insurers
are on on the same basis as insurance companies. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended §31A-22-309 states:
"(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is
subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be
held legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person
to whom benefits required under personal injury protection have
been paid by another insurer, including the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person who would
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-3be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b)
that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and
its amount shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration
between the insurers."
The Neel case, supra, is dispositive of the very issue in this case in which
the Court stated as follows:
"Section 41-12a-401 (1)(d) specifically requires that in order for the State
to self-fund its motor vehicle insurance obligations, it must have a
certificate of self-funded coverage. Section 41-12a-407(2) governs selffunding certificates and provides that anyone who holds
a certificate of self-funded coverage under this chapter shall pay
benefits to persons injured from the self-funded person's
operation, maintenance, and use of motor vehicles as would an
insurer issuing a policy to the self-funded person containing the
coverages under Section 31A-22-302.
Utah Code Annotated, §41-12a-407(2) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
See also section 41 -12a-306(3) (owners maintaining owner's security by
means other than an insurance policy must comply with sections 31A26-301 through - 3 1 1 , which govern the claim practice of 'insurers').
While the State is not a statutory 'insurer' for the general purposes of
title 31 A, section 41-12a-407(2) expressly requires the State to assume
certain obligations of an 'insurer' if the State elects to self-insure. By
electing to self-insure, the State has elected to provide PIP benefits in the
same manner an an independent insurer. If the State, as a self-insured
owner, must pay PIP benefits just as if it were an independent insurer of
those benefits, then there is no rational distinction between a lawsuit
brought against the State for failure to pay PIP benefits and a similar
lawsuit brought against an independent insurer. In both cases, the
injured party is suing the 'insurer' of the vehicle based upon a statutorily
created contractual claim.
We therefore hold that a suit to recover PIP benefits brought directly
agianst the State as the self-insurer of its motor vehicles is contractual
in nature. The State's election to self-insure cannot become a stumbling
block to the swift recovery of PIP benefits. Neel's benefit claim should
therefore be resolved in the same speedy manner it would have been had
the State purchased an independent insurance policy."
Page 37
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-4The defendant is this case is objecting pursuant to the case of McCafferv
on behalf of McCafferv v. Grow, supra, which states that arbitration is the correct
forum for reimbursement pursuant to PIP benefits. This may be so; but the State in
this case should demand arbitration or file an appropriate objection by motion. The
above-entitled Court, pursuant to a proper motion should then appoint an arbitrator to
hear the matter and properly dispose of it.
Therefore, putting all semantics aside, we will agree, pursuant to the
McCafferv case, supra, and Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22309(1), that the Court should appoint an arbitrator with the authority to arbitrate the
PIP benefits between Plaintiff and Defendant.
Dated t h i s ^ ? day of July, 1993.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

i/fHbrnas A. Duffin
Attorney for Plaintiff
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-5MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Response to the following
parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Barbara E. Ochoa
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
Litigation Division
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid, this ft / day of July, 1993.
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t
evidence in the record and for farther
findings and conclusions in support of the
alimony award.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1. In essence, Mr. Godfrey is claiming that he
received an advancement from his father in
anticipation of the share he would inherit from "his
father's estate. See Utah Code Ann. §75-2-110 (1993).
Even if Mr. Godfrey had provided sufficient evidence
that he had received an advancement on his
inheritance from his father, he cannot also claim the
advancement constituted a loan because the terms have
mutually inconsistent definitions. See Ned J, Bowman
Co. v. White, 369 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah 1962).
2. An exchange between Mrs. Godfrey's attorney and
the court supports this conclusion:
Mr. Hadfieid: Does the court find that there
has been proven a debt to the estate on the
Harper property? There were no documents that
were produced on that.
The Court: I believe there would be a debt on
it, yes. All debts that are in the form of
mortgages and that type of thing will have to be
assumed on the property she takes.
3. Mrs. Godfrey also contests Mr. Godfrey's assertion
of a $14,000 debt against another piece of property
awarded to her, allegedly owed to the family nursing
home corporation. Mrs. Godfrey points out that this
alleged obligation was unsupported by the evidence.
Moreover, the trial court did not make a finding
regarding this obligation. We agree that there is
insufficient evidence in the record to support the
existence of this claimed obligation.
4. Mr. Godfrey also argued the stock transfer was
restricted and the stock could only be sold to his
brother and sisters at par value, and thus, his two
hundred shares had a value of only $200. However,
the trial court doubted the enforceability of this
requirement and gave little weight to it in valuing the
stock.
5. We decline to use the record and to apply the three
factors as a matter of law on appeal.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Sue NEEL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 920547-CA
FILED: May 21, 1993
Second District, Weber County
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor
ATTORNEYS:
Daniel L. Wilson, Ogden, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Brent A. Burnett, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Onne, and Russon.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
BENCH, Judge:
Appellant, Sue Neel, appeals the trial court's
dismissal of her claim against the State of Utah
for insurance benefits. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
In December of 1990, Neel was a passenger in
a State-owned vehicle when she was injured in
an accident. Utah law requires the State to
maintain security providing certain benefits to
persons injured in automobile accidents
involving state-owned vehicles. Neel filed a
claim for benefits with the State Department of
Risk Management. She filed directly with the
State because the State was self-insured. When
no benefits were timely paid, Neel filed suit in
district court, seeking payment from the State as
the "insurer- of the vehicle.
The State moved to dismiss Neel's complaint.
It argued that since she was suing the State^ she
must comply with the procedural requirements
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-1 through -38 (1989).
Specifically, the State argued that Neel failed to
comply with section 63-30-12 which provides
that a party with a claim against the State must
file a notice of claim with the attorney general
and the agency involved before filing a lawsuit.
Additionally, the State claimed that she failed to
comply with section 63-30-19 which requires
that any lawsuit filed against the State be
accompanied by an undertaking to cover taxable
costs in the event the State prevails.
Neel responded that she was not required,to
comply with the notice and undertaking
tnts because she was bringing an action

in contract, ajaa contract suits are expressly
exempted from the procedural requirements by
section 63-30-5(1). .he trial court nevertheless
granted the State's motion and dismissed Neel's
complaint without prejudice.
Neel asserts on appeal that the trial court
misconstrued her contract claim to be a tort
claim. She contends that since the State is
self-insured, she must bring her contract claim
for benefits against the State directly, just as if
she were bringing it against a separate insurer of
the State. Consequently, she argues that the
notice of claim and the undertaking requirement
do not apply to her lawsuit. We agree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When we review a trial court's decision to
dismiss a cause of action, we assume that the
factual allegations made by the plaintiff are true.
We then review the trial court's ruling to see
whether the prevailing party was nevertheless
entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. We
therefore apply a correction-of-error standard of
review to the trial court's ruling. Anderson v.
Dean, 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah App. 1992).

moved to dismiss Neel's cause of action for her
failure to comply with the
vernmental
Immunity Act. Neel admits that she has not
provided the notice of claim and the undertaking
required by the Act. She claims, however, that
she is exempted from these requirements
because her claim against the State is contractual
in nature. Section 63-30-5(1) of the Act provides
that:
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived as to any contractual
obligation. Actions arising out of contractual
rights or-obligations shall not be subject to
the requirements of Sections 63-30-11,
63-30-12, 63-30-13,63-30-14,63-30-15, or
63-30-19.
(Emphases added.)
In response, the State faults Neel for not
identifying a contract between her and the State
that has been breached. It is unnecessary,
however, for Neel to identify a direct contract
between the parties since Neel is an intended
third-party beneficiary. Neel correctly asserts
that section 31A-22-309(5) expressly states that
an action brought to recover PIP benefits from
the insurer of a vehicle is contractual. Section
31A-22-309(5) provides: "If the insurer fails to
pay the expenses when due, . . . [t]he person
entitled to the benefits may bring an action in
contract to recover the expenses . . . ."
(Emphasis added.) The narrow issue involved in
this case is whether the State's assumption of the
role of self-insurer has altered the contractual
nature of an action brought against the State, as
the insurer, to recover PIP benefits.
The State claims that the reference to
"insurer" in section 31A-22-309(5) cannot
include the State and points to the statutory
definition of "insurer" found in section
31A-l-301(48)(a), which provides:
"Insurer" means any person doing an
insurance business as a principal, . . . and
any person purporting or intending to do an
insurance business as a principal on his own
account. 7/ does not include a governmental
entity, as defined in Subsection 63-30-2(3),
to the extent it is engaged in the activities
described in Section 31A-12-107.
(Emphasis added.) The State further cites to
section 31A-12-107, which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
title, a governmental entity, as defined in
Subsection 63-30-2(3), is not an insurer for
purposes of this title and is not engaged in
the business of insurance to the extent it is
covering its own liabilities under Title 63,
Chapter 30, the Governmental Immunity
Act, or engaging in other related risk
management activities related to the normal
course of its activities.
(Emphasis added.) Finally, the State argues that
the provisions of title 31A do not pertain to
self-insurers. Section 31A-1-103(3), states:
"Except as otherwise expressly provided, this
title does not apply to: . . . (f) self-insurance; .

ANALYSIS
Neel's assertion that her claim against the
State may be heard without complying with the
procedural requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act stems from the State's statutory
obligation to insure its motor vehicles.
The state of Utah and all its political
subdivisions
and their
respective
departments, institutions, or agencies shall
maintain owner's or operator's security in
effect continuously with respect to their
motor vehicles.
Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-301(3) (1988).
In order to maintain "owner's or operator's
security,M the State must exercise one of the
following methods of securing benefits for a
party injured in an automobile accident involving
a State vehicle: (1) an insurance policy; (2) a
surety bond; (3) a deposit with the state
treasurer; (4) a certificate of self-ftmded
coverage; or (5) a policy issued by the Risk
Management Fund. Section 41-12a-103(9).1
Each of these methods must provide the
following "personal injury protection" coverages
and benefits ("PEP benefits"): (1) reasonable
medical expenses; (2) lost income resulting from
an inability to work; (3) work the injured person
would have performed for his or her family; (4)
funeral benefits; and (5) wrongful death benefits.
See section 31A-22-307. These PIP benefits
must be provided for any "natural person whose
injuries arise out of an automobile'accident
occurring while the person occupies a [covered]
motor vehicle . . . ." Section 31A-22-308(3).
Finally, section 31A-22-309(5) provides that a
claimant entitled to PIP benefits may sue the
insurer of a vehicle if the insurer fails to pay the
PIP benefits within thirty days.
Neel brought her action against the State in
n
accordance with the foregoing statutes. The State
UTAH ADVANCEfBp'piRTS

00118

Codr- ^o
Pro
'tah

Neel v. State
213 Utah Adv.

These provisions indeed declare that the State
is not a statutory "insurer" as that term is
generally used in title 31A. However, this
exclusion of the State from the general
provisions of title 31A is superseded by specific
statutory language which expressly requires that
the State comply with certain portions of title
31 A. See Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply
Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984) ("When
two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the
more specific provision will govern over the
general provision."). Likewise, the exclusion of
self-insurance from the effects of title 31A is
overcome by other specific statutes expressly
providing that sections 31A-22-302 through -309
apply to self-insurers.
Section 41-12a-401(l)(d) specifically requires
that in order for the State to self-fund its motor
vehicle insurance obligations, it must have a
certificate of self-funded coverage. Section
41-12a-407(2) governs self-funding certificates
and provides that anyone who holds
a certificate of self-funded coverage under
this chapter shall pay benefits to persons
injured from the self-fimded person's
operation, maintenance, and use of motor
vehicles as would an insurer issuing a
policy to the self-funded person containing
the coverages under Section 31 A-22-302.
Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-407(2) (Supp. 1992)
(emphasis
added).
See
also
section
41-12a-306(3) (owners maintaining owner's
security by means other than an insurance policy
must comply with sections 31A-26-301 through
-311, which govern the claim practice of
"insurers").
While the State is not a statutory "insurer" for
the general purposes of title 31 A, section
41-12a-407(2) expressly requires the State to
assume certain obligations of an "insurer" if the
State elects to self-insure. By electing to
self-insure, the State has elected to provide PEP
benefits in the same manner as an independent
insurer. If the State, as a self-insured owner,
must pay PIP benefits just as if it were an
independent insurer of those benefits, then there
is no rational distinction between a lawsuit
brought against the State for failure to pay PIP
benefits and a similar lawsuit brought against an
independent insurer. In both cases, the injured
party is suing the "insurer" of the vehicle based
upon a statutorily created contractual claim.
We therefore hold that a suit to recover PIP
benefits brought directly against the State as the
self-insurer of its motor vehicles is contractual
in nature.2 The State's election to self-insure
cannot become a stumbling block to the swift
recovery of PIP benefits. Neel's benefit claim
should therefore be resolved in the same speedy
manner it would have been had the State
purchased an independent insurance policy.
CONCLUSION
Neel is suing the "insurer" of the Stateys
vehicle as is her "contractual" right P a g e 4 2
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opted to self-insure for the PIP benefits required
in section 31 A-22-302, it assumed the statutory
role of "insurer" for purposes of section
31A-22-309(5). A lawsuit brought by an injured
party against the State as the "insurer" of its
vehicles therefore remains contractual in nature.
Since Neel's cause of action was contractual in
nature, she was exempt from the notice of claim
and undertaking requirements found in the
Governmental Immunity Act. The trial court
therefore erred in dismissing her complaint.
The dismissal of Neel's complaint is reversed
and this matter is remanded to the trial court for
farther proceedings. 3
Russell W. Bench, Judge
I CONCUR:
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
I CONCUR IN RESULT:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. Regardless of the form of security selected, the
owner must provide the intended beneficiaries the full
benefits required by statute.
"Owner's or operator's security," "owner's
security/ or "operator's security" mean any of
the following:
(a) an insurance policy or combination of
policies conforming to Section 31A-22-302 which
is issued by an insurer authorized to do business
in Utah;
(b) a surety bond issued by an insurer
authorized to do a surety business in Utah in
which the surety is subject to the minimum
coverage limits and other requirements of policies
conforming to Section 31A-22-302, which names
the department as a creditor under the bond for
the use of persons entitled to the proceeds of the
bond;
(c) a deposit with the state treasurer of cash or
securities complying with Section 41-12a-4Q6\
(d) maintaining a certificate of self-funded
coverage under Section 41-12a-407\
(e) a policy conforming to Section 31 A-22-302
issued by the Risk Management Fund created in
Section 63-1-47.
Section41-12a-103(9)(Supp. 1992) (emphases added);
see also sections 4 l-12a-406(2)and -407(1) (expressly
referring to section 31 A-22-302); and section 31A-22-*
302 (requiring benefits found in section 31A-22-307).
2. Otherwise, individuals injured in State vehicles
could be treated differendy depending upon whether
the State opted to self-insure or to purchase an
independent insurance policy. If the State were to
purchase an independent insurance policy, a claimant
could simply file for PEP benefits without impediment.
If benefits were not timely paid, the claimant could
file a third-party beneficiary contract suit direcdy
against the insurer, without the cost of an undertaking.
The claimant could also file multiple benefit claims on
a monthly basis as soon as expenses accrued and the
insurer would be required to pay those benefits within
thirty days or face an immediate lawsuit.
If, on the other hand, a claimant were required to
satisfy the Governmental Immunity Act before
claiming PIP benefits, the claimant would "Wf\
additional costs and be required to jump throognr
additional procedural hoops. The claimant would be
either to file a separate notice of claim each

accumulate all claims and wait to file a single notice
of claim long after
accident. In either case, the
claimant may have ». wait for up to ninety days,
instead of thirty days, for a response from the
"insurer." It is unlikely that the legislature anticipated
or intended that claimants endure such delays when it
allowed the State to self-insure for PIP benefits. This
increased burden would clearly be inconsistent with
the legislative intent found in section 31A-22-309(5)
that all persons receive their PIP benefits from the
insurer of the vehicle immediately and with a
minimum amount of difficulty. See also section 31A26-302(1) ("All claims shall be settled as soon as
possible....").
3* The State asserts for the first time on appeal that
Neel, a State employee, is barred from seeking PIP
benefits from the State by the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. SeelML
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975)
(employees may not recover additional benefits from
an employer's no-fault insurance policy). Given the
fact that only the procedural prerequisites have been
placed in issue in this appeal, we do not address
whether the State is otherwise immune from Neel's
suit. Since that issue has yet to be addressed, it may
properly be considered on remand.
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gations to act in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. Heller failed
to provide a trial transcript in the record on
appeal. Absent a transcript, we must presume the trial court's findings are based on
admissible, competent, substantial evidence. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498
(Utah 1986). However, the challenged
findings pertain only to the loan agreement
between Rock Wool and Heller. Heller's
obligations thereunder are not conditions to
the Ekinses' liability under their unconditional guaranty. We conclude that findings as to bad faith under the loan agreement are not pertinent to the question of
liability on the personal guaranty.
The judgment in favor of the Ekinses is
reversed, and the award of attorney fees is
vacated. The case is remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment for Heller in the amount of Rock
Wool's indebtedness plus interest, costs,
and attorney fees.
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur.
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Michael H. McCAFFERY, as personal
representative for and on behalf of
Christopher M. McCAFFERY, deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Terry Raymond GROW, as personal representative of Rodney V. Grow, deceased, Terry Raymond Grow and Pat
Grow, individually, and State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 880566-CA.

Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya,
J., granted summary judgment in favor of
insurer, and father appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Orme, J., held that (1) father was
not entitled to personal injury protection
benefits and coverage under either insurance code or particular policy with insurer;
(2)u father was not entitled to proceed
against insurer under parental liability
statute; and (3) father could not seek subrogation from insurer.
Affirmed.
1. Insurance <3=>467.61(2)
Father of deceased passenger was not
entitled to personal injury protection coverage under the driver's policy where passenger was not a relative of the driver's family
who resided with them nor was he killed
while riding in a vehicle which was insured
by driver's insurer. U.C.A.1953, 31A-22308.
,2. Insurance ^=467.61(2)
Language of driver's policy, which provided personal injury protection benefits to
named insured and related persons who
resided with insured and other persons injured in insured vehicle, was not ambiguous and did not include passenger within
scope of coverage where passenger was
not a relative of the driver's family who
resided with them nor was he killed while
riding in the driver's vehicle which was
insured by his insurer.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 16, 1990.
Deceased passenger's father sued insurer of driver, who operated motor vehicle
without owner's consent, for personal injury protection benefits. The Third District
absolute guarantor may consent to the impairment of collateral, and such waiver may be
given in advance in the guaranty agre&l£ftt44

3. Compromise and Settlement <s=>16(l)
Deceased passenger's father, who settled his claims against minor driver's mother under statute imputing liability to person who signed application of minor for
driver's permit or license, could not reassert the claims in the guise of a further
claim against mother's insurer for personal
injury protection benefits. U.C.A.1953, 412-115(2).
4. Insurance <s=>2, 604(1)
Father of deceased automobile passenger was not an "insurer," notwithstanding
that one may legally provide security in lieu
provided it is explicit and unequivocal). See
also Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Sec.
Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 1095 (Uta^ \9*p\
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of automobile insurance, and thus, statute,
requiring personal injury protection (PIP)
insurer of person liable for injuries to reimburse another insurer who had paid PIP
benefits, did not require PIP insurer of negligent driver to reimburse father for sums
he expended due to the passenger's death.
U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-309(6).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

James R. Brown and Harold L. Reiser,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Darwin C. Hansen and John C. Hansen,
Bountiful, for defendants and respondents.
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and
ORME, JJ.
ORME, Judge:
Appellant Michael H. McCaffery appeals
from a summary judgment order dismissing his claim against respondent insurance
company for personal injury protection
benefits. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts are essentially undisputed in
this case. On August 27, 1986, a group of
high school students attended a "last summer fling" drinking party in East Canyon.
Sometime during the party, Christopher
McCaffery, Rodney Grow, and Michael
Quintana went joyriding up and down East
Canyon in an automobile owned by Michael
Morris, without his knowledge or permission. While Rodney Grow was driving the
vehicle, he lost control and crashed into a
tree. The three young men were killed.
The automobile was not insured. Moreover, it appears that neither Christopher
McCaffery, nor his parents with whom he
resided, had automobile insurance. Rodney Grow and his mother, who had signed
Rodney's driver's license application, were
insureds of respondent State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company ("State
Farm") at the time of the accident.

behalf of his late son Christopher's estate.
He claimed that Rodney Grow was liable,
and so sued his father and personal representative, Terry Grow. He claimed Pat
Grow, Rodney's mother, was jointly and
severally liable because she signed Rodney's driver's license application and Rodpey Grow was still a minor at the time of
his death. He claimed that State Farm
was responsible as the insurer of Rodney
Grow.
McCaffery settled all claims against all
defendants except for his claim for personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits
against State Farm. State Farm moved
for summary judgment on this claim. It
argued that neither its insurance policy nor
the law requires the payment of PIP benefits to a passenger injured in an automobile
which is not covered by the policy, even
though driven by an insured, where the
insured does not have the permission of the
owner. The district court agreed and
granted State Farm summary judgment.
On appeal, McCaffery raises several arguments. Although he did not himself see
fit to secure the insurance required by the
same law, he claims that the State Farm
policy impermissibly denies PIP benefits in
contravention of Utah's insurance code and
public policy. He asserts that the language in the insurance policy is ambiguous
and should be construed against State
Farm to allow recovery of PIP benefits.
He argues that State Farm should pay the
PIP benefits because it also insured Pat
Grow, who was liable as the signor of
Rodney's motor vehicle license application.
Finally, McCaffery argues that he is entitled to subrogation from State Farm for
the expenses he incurred as a result of
Grow's negligence.

DENIAL OF PIP BENEFITS
[1] The motor vehicle insurance sections of Utah's insurance code require every insurer to include liability coverage,
uninsured motorist coverage, and PIP coverage in their motor vehicle insurance policies. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302
(1989). The code extends PIP coverage to
individuals described in Utah Code Ann.
Michael
McCaffery
("McCaffery") § 31A-22-308 (1986) and prevents the inbrought suit against several defendantp^ surer from excluding PIP benefits to those
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persons except in seven narrowly defined
situations.
See Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-309 (1989).1
McCaffery focuses his argument on the
exclusionary provision set forth in section
309, relying on State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1987), and Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712
P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). These cases held
that an insurance company could not create
an exclusion which would prevent a resident family member of the insured from
recovering PIP benefits under the insured's policy.
In response to McCaffery's position,
State Farm argues the issue is not one of
exclusion from coverage. Rather, State
Farm argues that, unlike the plaintiffs in
Mastbaum and Call, Christopher McCaffery was never included in the class of
insureds. See Osuala v. Aetna Life &
Cos., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). See
also Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Padron9
310 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975).
We agree.
The insurance code provides that
"[e]very policy of insurance or combination
of policies, purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement . . .
shall also include personal injury protection
under sections 31A-22-306 through 31A22-309." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(2)
(1989). Section 306 then states that "[personal injury protection under Subsection
31A-22-302(2) provides coverages and benefits ... to persons described under
§ 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, and conditions set forth in
1. When this controversy arose the code only
contained four narrowly defined situations in
which the insurer could exclude PIP benefits.
The code provided:
Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured
while occupying another motor vehicle owned
by the insured and not insured under the
policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person
while operating the insured motor vehicle
without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of
the insured motor vehicle; or
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's
conduct contributed to his injury:
Page 46
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§ 31A-22-309."
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 31A-22-306 (1986) (emphasis added).
Thus, we must first look to section 308 to
determine who is within the scope of the
PIP coverage and benefits provided for bylaw.
Section 308 provides:
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection coverage:
(1) the named insured and persons
related to the insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who
are residents of the insured's household, including those who usually
make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere,
when injured in an accident in Utah
involving any motor vehicle; and
(2) any other natural person whose
injuries arise out of an automobile accident occurring in Utah while the person occupies a motor vehicle described
in the policy with the express or implied consent of the named insured or
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an
accident involving the described motor
vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308 (1986) (emphasis added). As concerns the subject
State Farm policy, McCaffery does not, nor
could he, claim that Christopher falls within the ambit of section 308. Christopher
was not a relative of the Grows who resided with them nor was he killed while riding
in the Grow vehicle insured by State Farm.
Thus, the law did not require State Farm to
extend PIP benefits to someone in Christopher's position.2
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(2)(a) (1986).
2. McCaffery argues that public policy requires
the extension of PIP benefits and coverage to all
innocent victims of automobile accidents. It is
true that the No-Fault Act was adopted in order
to protect the rights of innocent accident victims. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231,
235 (Utah 1985). However, "[a]n important aspect of the Act is the requirement that the PIP
protections for an injured motorist are to be
paid by his own insurer." Osuala v. Aetna Life
& Cos., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). It is
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Nor does State Farm's policy purport to
extend PIP benefits to Christopher. The
policy stated, in the No-Fault section, that
State Farm would "pay in accordance with
the No-Fault Act for bodily injury to
insured caused by accident resulting from
the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle." On the page immediately following this language, the policy
defined insured to mean, with our emphasis,
1. you, your spouse or any relative:
... and
2. any other person :
a. while occupying your car or a
newly acquired car with the permission of:
(1) you, your spouse, any relative;
or
(2) the person, driving such car with
your permission; or
b. when struck as a pedestrian by
your car or a newly acquired car.
The language in these provisions is no
more expansive than that in section 308.
Thus, neither the law nor the particular
policy in question purport to extend PIP
benefits to persons in Christopher McCaffery's position. We hold that McCaffery is
not entitled to PIP coverage under the
State Farm policy covering Rodney Grow.
AMBIGUITY OF POLICY
[2] McCaffery asserts that the language of the insurance policy is ambiguous
and should be construed to allow McCaffery to recover PIP benefits. This argument is without merit.
To illustrate his argument, McCaffery
cites State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Eastman, 158 Cal.App.3d 562, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 827 (1984). In Eastman, the California court determined that language in the
liability portion of a policy was ambiguous
and could reasonably be read to extend
coverage to appellant. The court concluded that, when ambiguous, language should
be read "in its most inclusive sense, for the

benefit of the insured/' 204 Cal.Rptr. at
830 (quoting Continental Cos. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal.2d 423, 296 P.2d
801, 810 (1956)).
Utah courts embrace the rule of law stated in Eastman. See, e.g., LDS Hosp. v.
Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 861
(Utah 1988) ("any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured and in favor
of coverage"). However, McCaffery has
not shown any ambiguity within the PIP
section of the policy. Rather, McCaffery
refers us to language in the liability portion of the policy which was similar to
language in the policy in Eastman. He
then implies that because language might
have been ambiguous in the liability section
of the policy we should find the entire
policy to be ambiguous and allow recovery
under the PIP section. This does not follow. McCaffery has settled any claims he
had under the liability section of the policy.
The only issue properly before us in this
appeal is the entitlement to PIP benefits
under the PIP section of the policy.
McCaffery has not demonstrated any relevant ambiguity in that portion of the policy.
On the contrary, the policy—clearly and
unambiguously—does not include Christopher McCaffery within the scope of coverage for PIP benefits.
PAT GROWS LIABILITY AS SIGNOR
OF RODNEY GROWS LICENSE
APPLICATION
[3] McCaffery argues that Pat Grow is
jointly and severally liable for the damage
caused by her minor child, Rodney, under
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115(2) (1988),
which provides:
Any negligence or willful misconduct
of a minor younger than 18 years of age
when operating a motor vehicle upon a
highway is imputed to the person who
has signed the application of the minor
for a permit or license. This person is
jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the negligence or willful misconduct
He further argues that State Farm, as Pat
Grow's insurer, is ultimately liable for

pertinent to note that the Legislature contemplated protection for Christopher McCaffery in
the instant situation through the insurance poliPage 47

cy the McCafferys should have acquired on their
own automobile. See id.
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these costs and should pay the PIP benefits.
In response to this assertion, State Farm
raises several arguments. However, we
need only address one argument which is
dispositive of the issue. In order to reach
State Farm on this theory, McCaffery must
first prove the liability of Pat Grow under
§ 41-2-115(2). Prior to summary judgment, the various parties to the action
reached a stipulation to dismiss McCaffery's complaint against all of the defendants except State Farm and to dismiss all
claims against State Farm except for the
claim concerning PIP benefits. Thereafter,
the court dismissed the various claims with
prejudice. McCaffery has settled his
claims against Pat Grow and cannot now
resurrect them in the guise of a further
claim against State Farm—especially
where the only claim expressly reserved as
against State Farm is that concerning PIP
STATE FARM'S DUTY TO
INDEMNIFY MICHAEL
McCAFFERY
[4] Finally, McCaffery apparently argues that State Farm is ultimately liable at
least for certain sums he actually expended
by reason of Christopher's death. He relies on section 309(6) of the insurance code,
which at the time of the accident was
phrased as follows:
Every policy providing personal injury
protection coverage shall provide:
(a) that where the insured under the
policy is or would be held legally liable
for the personal injuries sustained by
any person to whom benefits required
under personal injury protection have
been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund
of Utah, the insurer of the person who
would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount
of damages recoverable; and
3. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-301 to -412
(1988). However, McCaffery does not contend
he actually complied with these provisions.
Page 48

(b) that the issue of liability for that
reimbursement and its amounts shall
be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6) (1986)
(emphasis added). McCaffery cannot prevail under this statutory provision.
In order to invoke the provisions of section 309(6), the individual who initially pays
the amounts for which PIP benefits are
also available must be "another insurer."
Although McCaffery correctly observed at
oral argument that the law allows a person
to provide his or her own security in place
of automobile insurance,3 to do so does not
make one "an insurer" within the meaning
of the statute. According to Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-l-301(48)(a) (1989), " '[insurer'
means any person doing an insurance business as a principal." McCaffery does not
claim, and the facts do not suggest, that he
was a "principal" "doing an insurance business" when he paid Christopher's medical
bills and the like. Section 31A-22-309(6)
simply does not contemplate arbitration between an uninsured victim's father and another's insurance company.4
CONCLUSION
McCaffery is not entitled to PIP benefits
and coverage under either the Utah insurance code or the particular policy with
State Farm. Moreover, he is not entitled to
proceed against State Farm under
§ 41-2-115(2) because he stipulated to the
release of any claim he might have had
against Pat Grow. Finally, he may not
seek subrogation from State Farm under
§ 31A-22-309(6) because he is not "an insurer" within the meaning of the statute,
tn all rejects, we affirm.
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.

4. We note that even if we were to Find that
§ 31A-22-309(6) was available to McCaffery,
this court would not be the correct forum in
which to pursue his claim. The statute specifies
arbitration as the proper recourse.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
CASE NUMBER 920905486 PD
DATE 09/15/93
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK AJG

PLAINTIFF

VS
JACOBSEN, MIKE
DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. DUFFIN, THOMAS A.
D. ATTY. OCHOA, BARBARA H

PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO VACE MINUE ENTRY DATED JUNE 16,1993, MOTION
TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL ORAL
ARGUMENT ARE SUMMARILY DENIED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS;
1) THE JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY ENCOMPASED THE ISSUES
RAISED IN THE FOREGOING MOTIONS.
2) THE COURT REVIEWED NEIL VS STATE OF UTAH PRIOR TO
PREPARATION OF JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY AND FOUND
NEIL TO BE DISTINGUISHABLE FFROM THE PRESENT CASE.
3) THE COURT SUBMITS SECOND REQUEST TO THE STATE OF UTAH
TO PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS MINUTE ENTRY
AND THE JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY
CC: THOMAS A DUFFIN
BARBARA H. OCHOA
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
a body politic of the
State of Utah,

Civil No, 920905486PD
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court on April 19, 1993 on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
presiding• Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Thomas A. Duffin,
and Defendant was represented by

counsel, Barbara E. Ochoa,

Assistant Attorney General. In addition, the Court has considered
the

following

Plaintiff:

motions

which

were

subsequently

submitted

by

Motion to Vacate Minute Entry Dated June 16, 1993;

Motion to File Amended Complaint; and Motion for Additional Oral
Argument.
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard

r
the argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premd^
Page 50

oTO'

now orders as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of

action is granted for the reason that Plaintiff failed to comply
with the strict notice requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second cause of
action is granted for the reason that Plaintiff's complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under U.C.A.
§ 31A-22-309(5).
3. Plaintiff's Motions to Vacate Minute Entry Dated June 16,
1993, to File an Amended Complaint and for Additional Oral Argument
are denied for the reasons that the June 16, 1993 minute entry
encompassed the issues raised in Plaintiff's subsequent motions and
the Court had reviewed Neel v. State of Utah prior to issuing the
Minute Entry of June 16, 1993, and found it to be distinguishable
from the present case.

DATED this

A3

^

day of

T

, 1993

10NE E. MEDLEY
Thircfl/District Court Ijtf&g
Approved as t o form:
THOMAS A .

DUFFIN

2
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